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Abstract
This paper examines the relationship between monetary policy and banks excessive risk-taking and
banking crisis. We use a panel of data consisting of 22 Latin American countries, the OECD and South-
East Asia, which experienced banking crises between 1990 and 2013. Our empirical results show that the
adoption of an expansionary monetary policy via an increase in the money supply and the application of
low interest rates over an extended period of time may induce an increase in banks risk-taking. However,
a restrictive monetary policy with high interest rates increases the risk of banking crisis.
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1 Introduction
The 2008 ﬁnancial crisis showed the real fragility of development country ﬁnancial systems that was said to
be the most advanced in the world, the failure and collapse of international ﬁnancial markets has resulted
in them destructive eﬀects on the real economy in the world. The rapid expansion of credit and the collapse
of a series of asset bubbles in the real estate markets that have duelled on one hand the ﬂame of the crisis
causing disruptions in the global credit markets and also undermined the global economic stability.
Policy makers and researchers have questioned the real causes of the crisis, trying to explain the creative
forces of the fragility of the global ﬁnancial system. There seems to be a consensus on the possible causes
of the crisis, such as the failure of regulation and control, the development of instruments for complex credit
markets and poor governance practices. On the other hand, central banks are also blamed for their frequent
adoptions too accommodative monetary policies, which have fuelled a lively debate among economists. The
argument is that a prolonged period of low interest rates and lax liquidity conditions encourage ﬁnancial
institutions to take more risks. Proponents of this view argue that monetary policy is an important driving
force in the emergence of the ﬁnancial crisis. This statement is even more controversial because many central
banks lowered interest rates in response to the crisis in an attempt to overcome the recession.
In light of these developments, the debate on the relationship between monetary policy and ﬁnancial
stability has been intensiﬁed. During the pre-crisis, central banks do not take into account most of the
time the aspect of ﬁnancial stability, as conventional wisdom for the practice of monetary policy was only
to maintain price stability. Ensuring price stability is advanced as the best contribution by central banks
to improve economic progress, while macro-prudential tools are supported by regulatory authorities and
monitoring. However, recent crises have demonstrated that the actions of monetary policy can aﬀect the
stability of banks and can inﬂuence their behaviour and make them immune to risks.
However, a development in technology transfer credit native of ﬁnancial innovation has often been seen
as contributing to ﬁnancial stability. Certainly the ﬁnancial changes and new ﬁnancial instruments have
contributed to the improved proﬁtability, but they forced banks to take more risk. Such risk is mainly due
to changes in the behaviour of banks after the wave of ﬁnancial liberalization in the 70s. First, the resulting
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competition from deregulation of the banking system would erode the franchise value of the bank and
encourage them to pursue riskier policies in an attempt to maintain its former earnings. Then, increased risk
transfer through securitization that banks typically use on one hand to diversify and to reduce concentration
of credit risk and also as a source of alternative funding. But after the subprime crisis of 2007, a general
reassessment of risk associated with structured ﬁnancial instruments is observed throughout the ﬁnancial
community.
On this view, we consider monetary policy to lower the real interest rate, thirst for proﬁtability and
increasing competition in ﬁnancial markets are strong factors responsible for the behavioural change banks
opting for decision risk making them more vulnerable to the occurrence of a banking crisis. Thus, this chapter
will initially study the eﬀect of monetary policy and speculative behaviour by banks on their excessive risk-
taking and in a second test the eﬀect of this excessive risk taking the occurrence of a banking crisis.
2 Related Literatures
Several authors such as [Fisher, 1933] , [Hayek, 1937] and Kindleberger (1978) previously emphasized that
accommodative monetary conditions are a classic ingredient of changes in ﬁnancial and economic activities
between growth and recession. Indeed, low interest rates could induce a ﬁnancial imbalance by lower aversion
of banks and other investors to risk. This part of the monetary transmission mechanism was recently listed
as the ﬁrst of the three channels of risk-taking, which refers to how the exchange rate in monetary policy
aﬀect, the perception or risk tolerance (Borio and Zhu, 2008).Similarly, vein, [Adrian and Shin, 2010] argue
that the continued weakness of the low rates imply a steep yield curve for some time, a higher net interest
margin in the future, and thus a greater capacity of risk-taking in the banking sector.
The second mechanism involves a search for more performance with low nominal interest rates; prompting
asset managers of banks to take more risks ([Rajan, 2005]).Low interest rates can increase incentives pushing
asset managers to take more risk for a number of factors. Some are psychological or behavioural in-kind
such as the so-called money illusion: investors may ignore the fact that nominal interest rates can refuse
to compensate for inﬂation. Others may reﬂect institutional or regulatory constraints. For example, life
insurance and pension funds typically manage their assets with reference to their companies' liability. In
some countries, the commitments are linked to a guaranteed minimum nominal rate of return or yields reﬂect
actuarial assumptions in the long term rather than the current level of yields.
In general, when interest rates are low for an extended period of time, banks to deal with a reduction
in the margin between the debtor and the deposit rate are encouraged to move to riskier assets with higher
expected returns. From then on, more or less similar mechanism could be set up in executive compensation
and bank managers who would be directly related to their yields. Lower yields on safe assets such as bonds
with high ratings issued by government involve lower compensation for managers who want to play safe, and
vice versa. More broadly, the link between low interest rates and excessive risk-taking is also inﬂuenced by
competition, the structure of the systems management bonuses and gaps in surveillance and regulation.
The third mechanism is that monetary policy could also aﬀect risk-taking through how the central bank
will respond to adverse shocks. The commitment, for example, a central bank for the lowest future interest
rates in the case of a threatening shock, reduces the likelihood of incurring large downside risks, which
encourages banks to take on more risk (transparency eﬀect). This is a typical problem of moral hazard. It
should be stressed here that this eﬀect operates through the expected interest rate rather than the current
low rates themselves. For this, the magnitude of this eﬀect, however, depends on the current level of the
policy rate. Moreover, [De Nicolò et al., 2010] explain that the reduction in interest rates provided tend to
correspond to a position of higher risk when there is more room for monetary expansion, ie when current
rates are high.
In the same vein [Altunbas et al., 2010] explain that risk-taking can also be inﬂuenced by the level
of economic activity. Indeed, during economic expansion, agents become less risk averse because of the
anticipation of higher proﬁts from their investments. Therefore, monetary easing could, stimulating real
economic activity, so that asset managers are encouraged to take up positions at high risk.
Several empirical studies have attempted to verify the existence of a relationship between the decline
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in interest rates and the risk-taking behaviour of banks and to highlight the key features. Generally, these
empirical studies have focused on the impact of changes in monetary policies mainly through lower interest
rates on excessive risk-taking by banks. While the act of taking more risk is often linked to banks behaviour
change. Indeed, new ﬁnancial tools have facilitated the transfer of bank behaviour such as securitization
activity for the banks to get rid of bad loans, a practice that is more cost eﬀective than traditional inter-
mediation activity. While these tools improve bank proﬁtability but a sudden reversal or speculative attack
will inevitably lead to a banking crisis.
3 Data and methodology
The data used in this study were extracted from the database of the World Bank (2013) and the database
of Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2012).Our panel consists of 22 Latin American countries, the OECD and
South East Asia and that experienced banking crises between 1990 and 2013: Argentina, Colombia, France,
Germany, Greece, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Sweden, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, Poland,
Portugal, Spain, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of America and Uruguay.
To measure risk-taking banks three variables are to be involved; the ratio of non-performing loans (NPL),
the index of banking stability (Zscore) and the ratio of provisions for doubtful debts (Provnpl). Indeed, the
NPL ratio gives an indication of the quality of assets in terms of the potential for adverse exposure to
earnings and market values of equity due to worsening loan quality. Generally, non-performing loans allow
to reﬂect the level of portfolio risk loans or loans from a bank and the highest levels of this report suggest a
portfolio of riskier loans as part of the non-performing loans would likely result in losses for the bank ([Delis
and Kouretas, 2011]).The second proposed by [Roy, 1952] and measure used by [Goyeau and Tarazi, 1992]
, [Boyd, 2006] , [Laeven and Levine, 2009], indicates the separation distance of insolvency. Thus, a higher
value of Zscore indicates a low risk of default. Mathematically, Zscore can be written as follows:
Zscorei=
ROAi+
E
TAi
σ(ROAi)
(1)
Where ROAithe return on assets of banks,
E
TAi
the equity ratio and σ(ROAi) represents the standard
deviation of asset returns. Moreover, Zscore ratio represents the probability of a negative shock on proﬁts
that push banks to fail.Indeed, when Zscore increases with higher proﬁtability and market capitalization, it
decreases with an unstable income captured by the diﬀerence in return on assets. Therefore, a higher value
of Zscore involves a high level of bank stability and therefore less risk.
We chose as a third measure of risk variable in provisions for doubtful debts (Provnpl).The latter is often
called upon as a barometer of bank health. Generally banks make provisions to dodge against the possible
risk of party and non-repayment of loans. Thus, the increase in provisions is often synonymous with rising
risk. Indeed, the application of a restrictive monetary policy to decrease the volume of money in circulation,
increases interest rates, reduces reserves and bank deposits which lead to a deterioration in loan quality
and a signiﬁcant rise in provisions. To explain the excessive risk-taking by banks we retain 6 variables for
the various macroeconomic and monetary dimensions of banks. They represent the diﬀerent measurement
indicators of excessive risk-taking by banks, and they are grouped in the following table 1 and their expected
signs:
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Table 1  Banks Excessive Risk-Taking Indicators
Variables sign Interpretation
GDP (+/-)
(+) A good economic condition means proﬁtable investment and therefore a lower risk
(-) Also provied good economic incentives for banks to
seek more proﬁts and thus expose themeselves to more risk.
INF (+/-)
(+) The increase in inﬂation results in rising costs of spending local
businesses and therefore increases the probability of their insolvencies.
(-) The decline in inﬂation worsens the liquidity and thus increases bank insolvency.
TIR (+/-)
(-) Low interest rates could lead to a ﬁnancial imbalance by decline
in aversion of banks and other investors to the risks
(+) High interest rates attract riskier investors
M2R (+)
An increase in the money supply relative to
foreign exchange reserves increases countries'vulnerability
to sudden capital outﬂows and which leads to a rapid collapse of the exchange rate.
Cap (-) A decline in the market capitalization increases bank risk
In this study we adopt a conditional empirical strategy to choose the most appropriate estimation method.
The choice rule responds to what the variables of our models are co-integrated or not. If there is at least
one variable co-integrated then the least squares method modiﬁed (FMOLS) is used to model the panel
co-integrated and if the method of system GMM estimators in dynamic panel of[Arellano and Bover, 1995]
is applied and [Blundell and Bond, 1998].
The GMM-System method allows us to face a number of challenges identiﬁcation and, therefore, it is the
appropriate estimation method for several reasons.
We choose to estimate a dynamic empirical model in which we introduce the lagged dependent variable
with the explanatory variables that explains the persistence and the dynamic nature of risk. In addition,
the interest rate is considered endogenous in the bank risk equations. In other words, the direction of
causality between monetary policy and bank risk is not clear, and therefore, it is necessary to control for
reverse causality as a particular form of endogeneity. Moreover, some of the control variables are not strictly
exogenous. The endogeneity between risk and the speciﬁc characteristics of banks, which are explanatory
variables in our model, is another identiﬁcation problem. In this context, the GMM estimator proposed by
[Arellano and Bover, 1995] and [Blundell and Bond, 2000] is the preferred method because it incorporates
both the persistence of the risk and the potential endogeneity of the speciﬁc characteristics of the bank using
appropriate instruments, represented by their respective lags.
This estimator ensures eﬃciency and consistency provided that the dynamic regression model is not
subject to autocorrelation of second order, and that the instruments used are valid. For this we use the
tests of autocorrelation of ﬁrst and second order AR (1) and AR (2). Indeed, we would expect the presence
of a ﬁrst-order autocorrelation in the ﬁrst diﬀerentiated residuals. The p-value of AR (2) must largely
accept the null hypothesis of no serial correlation of order two in the ﬁrst-diﬀerence errors. Because higher-
order autocorrelation would imply that lags of the dependent variable are not really endogenous and so bad
instruments. In addition, the validity of the instruments is veriﬁed using Sargan test of over-identifying
restrictions. Our model is written as follows:
yit=αyit−1+βXit+ηi+it (2)
Where yit respectively for each model, represents the non-performing loans (NPL), the indicator of bank
stability (Zscore) and the provision made for doubtful debts (Provnpl). Xit is the matrix of control variables,
ηi is the individual speciﬁc eﬀect and it the error term.
Otherwise, a regression involving levels of integration of order 1 I (1) variables estimated using ordinary
least squares (OLS), can produce false results. In particular, the presence of an integration I (1) variables
may cause spurious regression. However, it is well known that if the series are co-integrated, the static
MCO, converge at a faster rate than is standard ([Hamilton, 1994]). The fully modiﬁed OLS method
(FMOLS), allows us to ﬁnd out the long-term relationship between the variables in the estimated model.
This estimation method was proposed by [Phillips and Hansen, 1990] and extended by [Phillips, 1995]. It is a
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semi-parametric procedure to estimate parameters of a co-integrating relationship which allows us to correct
the long-term endogeneity. This technique uses kernel estimators of nuisance parameters that aﬀect the
asymptotic distribution of OLS. To achieve asymptotic eﬃciency, this technique modiﬁes the least squares
method taking into accounts the eﬀects of correlation of test series and the endogenous explanatory variables
resulting from the existence of a co-integration relationship.
[Phillips and Hansen, 1990] show that the FMOLS estimator works well even with small samples when we
intend to make inferences of co-integrated system. FMOLS allows us to contribute to the empirical literature
on the estimation of a co-integrated panel model with non-stationary variables. With FMOLS method we
can estimate a multivariate model that identiﬁes the main determinants of bank risk-taking and its variation
over time.
Before estimating our models, it is necessary to check the stationarity of the series in the panel and the
lack of co-integrating relationship between them.
To check the stationarity of series we asked the panel test by [Levin et al., 2002] and [Im et al., 2003]
according to which the null hypothesis means the presence of a unit root and thus non-stationarity of the
series. In addition, the feature of both tests lies in the fact that the ﬁrst ([Levin et al., 2002]) allows the
presence of individual eﬀects and speciﬁc heterogeneity between individuals, while the second ([Im et al.,
2003]) allows the possibility of a heterogeneity in the very presence of a unit root in the panel. Test results
are provided by the following table 2:
Table 2  Panel unit root test in level
Variables
Levin,Lin et Chu Im,Pesaran et Shin
Statistics P-value Statistics P-value
NPL -6.21049 0.0000 -2.12234 0.0169
GPIB -9.35229 0.0000 -8.58800 0.0000
INF -183.310 0.0000 -87.9998 0.0000
TIR -1.42433 0.0772 -1.33671 0.0907
m2r -17.0940 0.0000 -22.1136 0.0000
CAP -9.94980 0.0000 -3.51186 0.0002
zscore -0.87092 0.1919 -0.74039 0.2295
Provnpl -3.77521 0.0001 -3.62873 0.0001
The null hypothesis of the presence of a unit root could not be rejected for TIR level and Zscore series.
In order to make these stationary series we have diﬀerentiated the ﬁrst order and the results are provided in
the following table 3:
Table 3  Panel unit root test (ﬁrst diﬀerence)
Variables
Levin, Lin et Chu Im, Pesaran et Shin
Statistics P-value Statistics P-value
TIR -27.0216 0.0000 -23.2066 0.0000
zscore -9.55112 0.0000 -8.09777 0.0000
After an initial diﬀerentiation, the variables are stationary in ﬁrst diﬀerences "I (1),"which suggests the
existence of a co-integration relationship. To test the existence of co-integration relationship between the
variables in our three models we applied the test proposed by [Pedroni, 1997] [Pedroni, 1998] [Pedroni, 2001]
that the null hypothesis means the absence of co-integration.
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Table 4  Pedroni cointegration test
Moddel
PP ADF
Stat. Panel Stat. Groupe Stat. Panel Stat. Groupe
NPL −0.985223
(0.1623)
0.585561
(0.7209)
−1.015572
(0.1549)
−0.369783
(0.3558)
Zscore −2.217880
(0.0133)
−4.394762
(0.0000)
−2.699923
(0.0035)
−4.600342
(0.0000)
ProvNpl 1.896614
(0.9711)
0.432692
(0.6674)
1.752641
(0.9602)
−0.526751
(0.2992)
This table 4 shows that the test [Pedroni, 1997] [Pedroni, 1998] [Pedroni, 2001] accepts the null hypothesis
of no co-integrating relationship between the NPL and ProvNpl models and their explanatory variables. Fur-
thermore, the test rejects the null hypothesis of absence of co-integration relationship between the variables
of Zscore's model. Thereafter, we can say that there is a long-term relationship between banking stability
and the regressors.
In the next section, we will proceed with the presentation and interpretation of the results of our empirical
analysis.
4 Results and discussion
The estimation results of the three models are shown in the following table 5:
Table 5  Estimation results
Model
MR=NPL
[GMM ]
MR=ProvNpl
[GMM ]
MR= Zscore
[FMOLS]
t-Statistic t-Statistic t-Statistic
MRt−1 84.77200
(0.0000)
(∗∗∗) 1.01E + 11
(0.0000)
(∗∗∗) -
GPIB −3.954368
(0.0001)
(∗∗∗) −3.684187
(0.0003)
(∗∗∗) 5.593271
(0.0000)
(∗∗∗)
CAP −3.669624
(0.0003)
(∗∗∗) 4.225457
(0.0000)
(∗∗∗) 2.686414
(0.0075)
(∗∗)
INF 4.216202
(0.0000)
(∗∗∗) 4.066478
(0.0001)
(∗∗∗) −0.250905
(0.8020)
TIR −2.968566
(0.0032)
(∗∗) −3.193535
(0.0015)
(∗∗) 0.608066
(0.5435)
M2R −3.134413
(0.0018)
(∗∗) −3.096506
(0.0021)
(∗∗) 3.218823
(0.0014)
(∗∗)
Signif. codes: 0 (***) 0.001 (**) 0.01 (*) 0.05 (.) 0.1 ( ) 1
The estimation results on the ﬁrst model Mnpl shows that all variables are statistically signiﬁcant with
a negative sign to an exception made for inﬂation (INF) which shows a positive sign. In fact, the stance
of monetary policy measured by the change in the real rate internet giving a negative signiﬁcance at 5%,
suggesting that the decline in the rate negatively impacts the quality of the loan portfolio and therefore the
ﬁnancial banks strength. In other words, the bank risk-taking increases when the real interest rate decreases.
This is consistent with the ﬁndings of previous empirical literature ([Rajan, 2005]) that decreases in long-
term interest rates encourage asset managers to take more risk for more return. As indicated in[Altunbas
et al., 2010] , the decline in the quality of the loan portfolio is probably enhanced by the reduction in funding
costs of banks' liquidity due to lower short-term rates of interest ([Diamond and Rajan, 2009], [Adrian and
Shin, 2010] ).
Moreover, the variable money supply relative to reserves is statistically signiﬁcant at 5% with a negative
sign for both models Mnpl, MprovNpl and positive for Mzscore. This means that an expansionary monetary
policy increases the money supply, induces long-term reduced risk and the provision of risk and promotes
banking stability. This can be explained by the fact that an increase in the money supply favouring lower
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interest rates attract risk-averse investors and stabilize the performance of bank loans. Moreover, households
and investors with risky projects rather have preference to higher interest rates since they think they will win
if their investments will pay oﬀ. But the opposite can occur when low rates are charged on mortgages that
attract the lowest power repayment household wishing to acquire a home. This is the case of the mortgage
crisis of 2008 in the United States shown in the following ﬁgure 1.
Figure 1  Monetary Expansion, Interest Rate Reduction and Increased risk Mbpl
On the other hand, the variable inﬂation is statistically signiﬁcant at 1% with a positive sign indicating
that an increase in inﬂation increases the risk Mnpl and MprovNpl. Indeed, growth in the money supply
leads to a rise in the levels of expected prices and consequently an increase in inﬂation which adversely aﬀects
the ability of borrowers to repay their debts because of their increased spending cost. Figure 2 reﬂects the
behaviour of the variable inﬂation (INF), the real interest rate (TIR) and the relative risk Mnpl, shows that
during the year 2007-2008 along with believes the risk of inﬂation and inversely with the TIR rates.
Figure 2  Inﬂation, Interest Rate Reduction and Increased risk Mnpl
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Regarding the impact of macroeconomic variables, GDP growth is signiﬁcantly negative at 1%, as shown
in the ﬁrst column of Table 2.6, which implies that the probability of default is negatively correlated with the
growth rate GDP. Good economic condition is always associated with an increased number of projects that
can pay oﬀ in terms beings, which in turn leads to a reduction in the overall bank credit risk ([Kashyap and
Stein, 1994], [Altunbas et al., 2010]). In addition, borrowers earn more and, therefore, their ability to repay
their loans would be higher in periods of rapid economic growth. This result is consistent with the ﬁndings
of[Gambacorta, 2009] , [Altunbas et al., 2010], while it is the opposite of [Delis and Kouretas, 2011] who
demonstrate a positive relationship between the economic growth (GDP) and risk in the European banking
sector. One possible interpretation of this positive relationship is that in times of good macroeconomic
conditions, banks looking for high returns tend to give more credit and soften their control standards.
Contrariwise, and as shown in our results this is not the case of the banking systems of our study.
The bank capitalization variable is statistically signiﬁcant at 1% with a negative sign, meaning that
well-capitalized banks give fewer non-performing loans and thus a relatively low level of risk. The negative
impact of capital on bank risk suggests that banks with strong capital and equity ratio compared to higher
assets are less exposed to the risk of moral hazard and tend to behave more cautiously. Banks use this capital
as a buﬀer to oﬀset the risk of possible losses on risky assets. On the other hand, regulators and markets
do not encourage riskier banks to accumulate capital ([Altunbas et al., 2012]), that is to say, they do not
have to compensate for the risk by higher levels of capitalization. In addition, our result is in line with the
hypothesis of moral hazard, which suggests that when the level of bank capital is low, bank managers have
more incentives to take excessive risks arising from the existence of problems agency agreement between
bank managers and shareholders. Thereafter, we can say that banks with higher capital levels tend to have
a better loan portfolio quality and therefore enjoy lower credit risk.
5 Conclusion
In this study we tested the eﬀect of monetary policy and speculative behavior of banks as factors of risk-
taking on the probability of a banking crisis. The results show that in a favorable economic situation with
a restrictive monetary policy when interest rates are high, the risk of a banking crisis increases. It turned
out that banks in a phase of economic expansion are more lax in terms of credit supply, which increases
the volume of bad loans. In addition, some monetary authorities, adopting high interest rates as a laborer
to counteract the credit boom, fall into adverse selection and attract more and more risk borrowers. This
reversal rate also aggravates the situation of former borrowers since they will therefore pay more and so some
are insolvent, making banks more vulnerable and exposed to the risk of bankruptcy.
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